
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## U.S./IRANIAN CONTACTS AND THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES

From the earliest months following the Islamic revolution in Iran, the U.S. Government has attempted to reestablish official contact with that government in order to discuss strategic developments in this critical part of the world and reconstruct a working relationship. Even before President Reagan came to office the U.S. Government agreed to try to expand security, economic, political, and intelligence relationships at a pace acceptable to Tehran. In the fall of 1979, the U.S. undertook three secret missions to Tehran:

-- September 1979 (met secretly with Bazargan at the request of the Iranians)

-- October 1979 -

-- October-November 1979 - (discussed normalization of relations)

When these meetings and the secret November 1, 1979 meeting in Algiers, between Brzezinski and Prime Minister Bazargan, became public in Iran, they helped precipitate the takeover of the U.S. Embassy by radical elements and led to the resignation of the Bazargan government. These events have adversely influenced Iran's subsequent willingness to engage in any direct contact with the USG.

Despite mutual difficulties involved in re-establishing normal relations, our strategic interests in the Persian Gulf mandate persistent efforts to establish a dialogue. In this regard, it is notable that only a few major countries do not have relations with Iran -- Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Israel, South Africa, and the United States. Even Iraq continues to have diplomatic relations with Iran.

Iran is the key to a region of vital importance to the West, yet it is increasingly threatened by growing Soviet military power and political influence along its borders and inside its territory. Over the course of the last two years, the Soviets and their surrogates have moved actively to gain greater influence in the Gulf:

-- The Soviets believe that once Khomeini dies, they will have an excellent opportunity to influence the formation of a government in Tehran that serves Soviet strategic interests in the area.

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Partially Declassified / Caleased on 5 May 87
under provided of E.D. 12356

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Communist nations have become the principal arms suppliers to Iran -- making Iran dependent on this source of supply in contending with an increasingly strengthened Iraq. This leads us to the conclusion that the Soviets may well be attempting to pursue their own revolution in Iran. That is, by fueling both sides in the conflict, the Soviets could well encourage a disastrous "final offensive" by Iran that would precipitate a political disintegration in Iran, leaving a power vacuum which the Soviets could exploit. Specifically, the indicators of Communist influence in Iran are:



The increasing desperation brought on by the costs of the Iran-Iraq war has exacerbated Iran's vulnerability to Soviet influence. Moreover, Soviet designs in Afghanistan, pressure on Pakistan, and actual crossborder strikes in Iran from Afghanistan have made reopening a strategic dialogue increasingly important.

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In short, the Soviets were far better positioned to improve significantly their influence in the region in 1985 when we were presented with an opportunity to open a dialogue with Iran. In deciding to exploit this opening we evaluated previous efforts through more conventional channels which had not succeeded.

About two years ago, senior Tranian officials apparently decided that some accommodation with the U.S. was necessary. Since 1983, various countries have more overtures to the S.S. and Iran in an effort to stimulate direct contact.

debates made it difficult for the Tranians to respond to these overtures.

Numerous individuals and private parties have likewise attempted to be helpful as intermediaries in establishing contact in Iran or in seeking Iranian assistance in the release of our citizens held hostage in Lebanon.

In 1985, a private Americas citizen (Michael Ledeen) was representative de Israeli government) (David Kimche), and in that the Israeli government) (David Kimche), the Israeli had established a liaison relationship with an Iranian expatriate (Manuchehr Ghorbanifar) in Europe who sought Israeli help in establishing contact with the U.S. Government. In acknowledging the need to demonstrate the bonafides of the officials involved, he (Ghorbanifar) indicated that his "sponsors" in Tehran could also help to resolve the American hostage situation in Beirut.

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The Israelis analyzed this intermediary's background exhaustively in order to validate his legitimacy. This analysis led them to have extremely high confidence in his standing and genuine relationship to the highest Iranian officials. Based in large part upon the Israeli evaluation and in recognition of the clear U.S. interest in a dialogue that might, over time, lead to the moderation of Iranian policies, the U.S. established an indirect contact with the Iranian intermediary in mid-1986, through the private U.S. citizen and a semior Israeli official. These contacts were established through the National Security Council staff with the full knowledge of appropriate Cabinet officers. From the very first meeting with the Israelis and the Iranian, it was emphasized that the OGG could not proceed with direct contact unless Iran renounced terrorism as an instrument of state policy.

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In June of 1985, in the midst of the TWA-847 hijacking, the Israeli officials in direct contact with the Iranian expatriate asked him to use his influence with senior Iranian officials to obtain the release of the hijacked passengers. Two days after this approach, four Americans held separately from the rest of the hijacked passengers were freed and turned over to Syrian authorities.

Speaker Rafsanjani, who was travelling in the mid-east at the time, and Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati both intervened with the captors. Rafsanjani, in his speech on November 4, 1986, for the first time publicly acknowledged his role in this matter.

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In July of 1985, the Israelis advised that they believed they were close to achieving a breakthrough in their contact with Irah and would proceed unless we objected. It is important to note that the U.S. had long been aware of Israeli efforts to maintain discreet contact with Iran and that they had in the past provided Iran with assistance in its war with Iraq. Despite long-term U.S. efforts to convince the Israelis to desist we believe that israel continued to provide limited military and industrial tachnology to Iran — even after they officially told us that such activities had ceased. The USG judged that the Israelis would persist in these secret deliveries, despite our objections, because they believed it to be in their strategic interests.

On August 22, 1985, a senior Israeli official (David Kimche) visited Washington and met with the National Security Advisor. The Israeli asked us to acquiesce in a single Israeli delivery of defensive military materiel to Tehran. He urged that we allow such an action to take place in order to gain increased influence in Tehran. Mr. McFarlane stated that the U.S. could in he way be construed as an "arms for hostages" deal and that there could be no guarantee that whatever items of U.S. origin Israel sent, could be replaced. Ne were subsequently informed that the Israelis had delivered 508 Tows at the end of August. Though we were not specifically aware of the shipment at the time it was made we did make a subsequent decision not to expose this Israeli operation so that we would have the option of exploiting existing Israeli channels with Tehran in our own effort to establish an Israeli channels with Tehran in our own effort to establish an Israeli managed this entire operation, to include delivery, artangements funding, and transportation. The total value of this shipment was lass than \$2 million and, therefore, below the threshold for required reporting of a military equipment transfer under the Arms Export Control Act.

On September 14, 1985, Reverend Benjamin Weir was released in Beirut by the Islamic Jihad Organization. This release was preceded by an intense effort on the part of Mr. Terry Waite, the Special Emissary of the Archbishop of Canterbury. To this date, Mr. Waite remains the only Westerner to ever meet directly with the Lebanese kidnappers.

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